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On 2 April 1982 Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands2 and the next day they 
occupied South Georgia. The small British garrisons based in both of these locations 
put up a spirited defense but were forced to capitulate in the face of overwhelming 
numbers.  The Falkland Islands are situated in the South Atlantic, 400 miles to the 
west of Argentina and 8,000 miles southwest of the United Kingdom (UK).  There are 
two main islands, West Falkland and East Falkland and the only town of any size, 
Port Stanley, is situated on the latter.  South Georgia lies 800 miles to the south-east 
of the Falklands.  To the apparent surprise of the Argentinean ruling Junta, the British 
dispatched a maritime task force to the South Atlantic intent on restoring British 
administration to the islands.  The first ships of this task force sailed from the UK on 
5 April.  By 25 April British forces had recaptured South Georgia and on 14 June the 
Royal Marine commanding British land forces in the Falklands, Major-General 
Jeremy Moore, accepted the surrender of all Argentine forces in the Islands. 
 
In the aftermath of the conflict there were numerous studies into the conduct of 
military operations and the lessons that could be drawn.  Some commentators 
concentrated on the legal and diplomatic ‘lessons’ whilst others took a more military 
focus.  The war provided a rare opportunity to test equipment and tactics in actual 
combat and much of the resulting literature concentrated on these issues.  Equally, the 
requirement for the British to conduct major expeditionary operations at extended 
range and beyond the reach of land based air cover caused many to question the 
overtly Euro-centric focus of UK defense policy and to argue in favor of a new 
emphasis on what were called ‘out of area’ capabilities3.   Prior to the Falklands 
Conflict British policy had been to rely on forces devoted to North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) contingencies to provide such out of area capabilities.  No 
significant special military capability was retained for operations beyond Europe.  
This stands in stark contrast to contemporary British defense policy where a 
considerable emphasis is placed upon expeditionary forces able to operate at extended 
range.  This paper will analyze the impact that the Falklands Conflict had on British 
approaches to expeditionary warfare, in particular it will concentrate on maritime 
expeditionary capabilities.  It will examine the impact that the war had on British 
thinking and assess the degree to which contemporary developments have their 
origins in ‘lessons’ derived from that experience. 
Britannia in Retreat. 
Britain retained interests and responsibilities around the globe after 1945.  The UK 
maintained significant forces beyond Europe in order to protect British interests, 
support friendly rulers and ensure stability during the difficult process of de-
colonization. However, the apparent threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies in 
                                                 
1 The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the UK 
Ministry of Defence or any other government agency. 
2 In Argentina the Falkland Islands are known as The Malvinas. 
3 In essence ‘out of area’ meant beyond the NATO region. 
 1
Europe was the main focus for British defense policy.  In an unprecedented step, 
Britain retained peacetime conscription after 1945 and in 1954 it agreed to the 
permanent deployment of four army divisions and a tactical air force in West 
Germany.  The main priority for the Royal Navy was preparation for a third Battle of 
the Atlantic, this time against Soviet submarines, bombers and surface raiders.  
Expeditionary capabilities received a very low priority.  The costs of this approach 
were demonstrated in 1956 when the British armed forces were unable to mount a 
rapid response to the crisis that followed Colonel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal.  By the time that the British, with French assistance, were able to launch a 
combined airborne and amphibious operation to seize the canal, domestic and world 
opinion had turned decisively against the use of military force.  The result was a 
humiliating political debacle that demonstrated the limits of British power.4
 
The Suez crisis provided added impetus to moves that were already underway to 
improve Britain’s expeditionary capabilities.  The defense review conducted by 
Duncan Sandys in 1957 announced the end of conscription, with a new emphasis on 
nuclear weapons to maintain the peace in Europe and more mobile and flexible 
conventional forces to protect British interests overseas.5  Conventional war-fighting 
in Europe was now seen as unlikely and thus shorn of its previous role, the Royal 
Navy embraced the expeditionary role with enthusiasm.  In the years that followed 
they built the case for a major new capability based around a modern amphibious task 
group supported by large aircraft carriers, cruisers and a range of escorts and 
replenishment ships.  As a result, the aircraft carriers HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion 
were converted into helicopter equipped commando carriers (LPH), two new dock 
landings ships (LPDs) were built to replace the worn-out vessels of the existing 
Amphibious Warfare Squadron and six new logistic landing ships (LSLs) were 
ordered.6  The ‘jewel in the crown’ of the navy’s plans was the construction of a new 
generation of large aircraft carriers capable of operating a balanced air group of 
fighter, strike, airborne-early warning and anti-submarine aircraft.  In 1963 the 
government approved the plans to build the first such ship, codenamed CVA-01 and 
to be called HMS Queen Elizabeth.  At 53,000 tons it would be the largest and most 
capable vessel ever built for the Royal Navy.7   
 
Unfortunately the ship was never built.  The navy proposals had aroused intense 
opposition from the Royal Air Force (RAF) who believed that British interests 
overseas could be better protected more cheaply through the application of land based 
airpower.8  A pressing requirement to find economies in the defense budget forced the 
new Labour administration to review Britain’s defense posture.  In a series of reviews 
between 1966 and 1968 British military commitments beyond Europe were reduced 
and then largely removed.  CVA-01 was cancelled as was the RAF’s favored 
alternative of 50 F-111A strike aircraft.   In future British conventional forces would 
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be concentrated in the European theatre and would focus on NATO tasks.9  It is 
notable that this process coincided with a re-emphasis by NATO on conventional 
forces in Europe with the introduction of the new concept of Flexible Response.   
 
The reduction in the British military presence beyond Europe was initially to have 
been offset by the maintenance of a special capability for intervention.10  However, in 
a new round of cuts in January 1968 the government announced that no such 
capability would be maintained, only a general capability based on forces required for 
NATO duties was promised.11  The concentration on NATO tasks was reinforced by 
yet another defense review in 1975.  In future UK defense policy would concentrate 
on four key areas:  maintenance of the independent nuclear deterrent; direct defense 
of the UK homeland; a major land and air contribution to the European mainland; 
and, a major maritime commitment in the Eastern Atlantic and the English Channel.  
Remaining ‘out of area’ capabilities and commitments beyond NATO were reduced.  
It was indicative of the tone of this review that replacements for the two LPDs were 
removed from the Long Term Costings.12
 
This process reached its logical conclusion in the 1981 defense review conducted by 
the Conservative Minister of Defence, John Nott.   Nott sought to control expenditure 
on defense by seeking the most cost effective means of meeting the existing four 
defense roles.  He ruthlessly cut back expenditure on capabilities that did not meet his 
strict interpretation of British requirements.   The review, published in June 1981 with 
the title ‘The Way Forward’, acknowledged that British defense concerns were not 
limited by the boundaries of the NATO treaty area.  It sought a limited enhancement 
of out-of-area capabilities based on plans for a ‘modest’ stockpile of basic army 
equipment for contingency deployments and exercises, the designation of an existing 
headquarters to plan and command such operations and an increase in airlift and 
parachute assault capabilities.  These modest enhancements were more than offset by 
the serious cuts in maritime expeditionary capabilities envisaged in the review.13  
 
Nott appeared unconvinced of the value of a traditional balanced surface fleet with a 
range of capabilities.  He believed that the navy’s main task after provision of the 
national nuclear deterrent, that of anti-submarine warfare in the eastern Atlantic, 
could be most effectively conducted using nuclear powered submarines (SSNs), land 
based maritime patrol aircraft and a reduced number of surface escorts.  
Expeditionary capabilities did not figure prominently in his vision for the future navy.  
Nott contemplated abolishing the Royal Marines but eventually decided only to scrap 
the specialist amphibious LPDs.14  In addition he announced the intention to sell the 
old aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and the first of three smaller Invincible class aircraft 
carriers.  Frigate and destroyer numbers were to be reduced from 65 to 50 with eight 
of these ships in reserve.  The Review anticipated a resumption of the practice of 
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sending substantial naval task groups on long detachments for visits and exercises in 
the South Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian Ocean and Far East.  However, such task groups 
would be used primarily for purposes of naval diplomacy and would not represent a 
balanced maritime force capable of projecting military power overseas.   
 
In the event, the decision to scrap the LPDs was reversed before the Falklands 
Conflict and both vessels went on to play a vital part in British operations in the South 
Atlantic.  Nevertheless the cuts proposed by Nott were the cause of serious concern 
within the Royal Navy.  The Navy Minister, Keith Speed, was dismissed for opposing 
Nott’s plans.15  The Nott Review was a response to and a reflection of an enduring 
dilemma within British defense policy.  As a medium sized power with limited 
resources it was difficult for Britain to simultaneously meet alliance commitments in 
Europe and to maintain a military capability to support the country’s many remaining 
interests, responsibilities and commitments beyond.  ‘The Way Forward’ stated that 
Britain’s ‘needs, outlook and interests’ gave it a ‘special role and a special duty’ 
beyond the boundaries of the NATO Treaty.16  In common with its predecessors the 
review did not conclude that this special role and special duty would require any 
special capability.  With the exception of the modest enhancements outlined above, 
wider defense interests would be met by forces devoted primarily to NATO duties.  
The Falklands Conflict was to test the validity of this approach. 
The ‘Lessons of the Falklands’ 
The Falklands Conflict was viewed with great interest by commentators on both sides 
of the Atlantic.  Even before the campaign was over pundits were trying to assess the 
‘lessons’ that could be drawn from it.  Within a matter of months the first books 
seeking to analyze the campaign had been published and they were to be followed by 
many more in the years that followed.17  The conflict was interesting for a number of 
reasons.  It provided a rare insight into the performance of numerous weapons 
systems in actual combat.  It also offered a chance to test tactics and techniques and 
provided a means of assessing the professional competence of the forces involved.  
The conflict was the first time since 1945 that a major western navy had come under 
sustained air attack at sea.  It was the first time that a nuclear-powered hunter killer 
submarine conducted a successful attack on enemy surface units.  The conflict 
provided the operational debut for the short take off and vertical landing Harrier and 
illustrated the strengths and limitations of the UK’s new Invincible class aircraft 
carriers.  It tested the ability of a modern, medium sized navy to conduct operations at 
extended range under attack by a relatively sophisticated foe in the arduous conditions 
of the South Atlantic.  The results shed light on the UK government’s claim that 
forces devoted specifically to NATO contingencies in Europe would also be capable 
of meeting defense needs beyond the NATO area. 
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The conflict was essentially maritime in nature.  British victory depended on the 
Royal Navy gaining sufficient sea control to put ashore a landing force and to support 
it in the subsequent land campaign.  The threat that the Argentine surface fleet posed 
to British operations was neutralized early in the conflict.  The sinking of the ancient 
cruiser General Belgrano by the SSN HMS Conqueror on 2 May demonstrated a 
potent threat to which the Argentine surface fleet had no answer.  As a result they did 
not venture beyond their own coastal waters for the remainder of the conflict.  
Argentine diesel/electric submarines were barely more successful.  In April 1982 
Argentina had three seaworthy boats, including two modern German-built Type-
209s.18  Unfortunately their torpedo armament was unreliable and there were no 
successful attacks on enemy shipping. One Argentine submarine, the Santa Fe, was 
disabled on the surface by British helicopters.  Nevertheless, the British placed a great 
emphasis on anti-submarine warfare and the effort expended chasing false contacts 
demonstrated their concern in this field.19  Sea mines, a weapon with great potential 
given the lack of mine countermeasures vessels within the UK task force, were not 
deployed in any numbers except in the immediate vicinity of Port Stanley.20
 
The greatest challenge to British sea control came from the aircraft of the Argentine 
air force and navy.21 Ever since the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by Egyptian 
attack craft armed with anti-ship missiles in 1967 the threat of sea-skimming missiles 
to surface warships had preoccupied naval planners.  Argentina possessed a small 
number of French built Exocet anti-ship missiles capable of being launched by air.  
The threat that they posed was one of the most pressing concerns for the British.22  In 
the event, one destroyer was sunk and another damaged by Exocet missiles, in the 
latter case by a land-based missile fired from a mobile launcher on East Falkland.  In 
addition to this the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor was also sunk, carrying with it 
most of the landing force’s heavy lift helicopters.   Three more warships and a Royal 
Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) were sunk by conventional bombs dropped at low level by the 
Argentine air force and eight warships and two RFAs suffered varying degrees of 
damage, although most remained operational.23
 
Despite these seemingly heavy losses the Argentine air force and navy failed in their 
attempts at sea denial.  Neither of the two critical aircraft carriers were successfully 
attacked and the vulnerable amphibious and transport shipping unloading men and 
equipment in San Carlos Water remained unharmed.  The loss of frigates and 
destroyers, while tragic in human terms, was certainly not without historical 
precedent.  The escorts fulfilled their primary role and protected the critical assets of 
the task force, although the loss of Atlantic Conveyor demonstrated the dangers of 
concentrating important material in a single vulnerable ship.  In many respects the 
British were lucky.  The Argentine air force conducted their attacks with extra-
ordinary bravery but were operating at the limits of their range, in a role for which 
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they had little training or experience.  Even so, the margin between success and 
failure was very narrow.  Had all of the bombs that hit Royal Navy ships actually 
detonated then British losses would have been much heavier.24
 
The British air defense effort was undermined by a variety of factors.  In common 
with their opponents, this was a role for which the Royal Navy was relatively ill-
equipped.  The absence of airborne early warning (AEW), the limited range, speed 
and numbers of fighter aircraft embarked and the indifferent performance of defensive 
missile systems designed to operate against high level Soviet bombers in the eastern 
Atlantic increased the vulnerability of surface ships to air attack.  The presence of a 
large, conventional aircraft carrier equipped with fixed wing AEW aircraft and long 
range, supersonic fighters would have transformed this situation.  Unfortunately the 
last British carrier that met this criteria, HMS Ark Royal, had been decommissioned in 
1978.  US commentators were not slow to note the dangers in operating beyond the 
range of land based air defense without the range of capabilities offered by a large 
aircraft carrier.25
 
Despite the age of the key landing ships, and a reliance on merchant vessels for 
additional lift, the British were able to land No. 3 Commando Brigade at a time and 
place of their own choice and supported it, reinforced by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 
throughout the subsequent land campaign.  The landing at San Carlos illustrated the 
fact that an ability to assault a directly defended beach is not always required when 
alternative landing sites are available.  Once ashore the landing force faced a range of 
challenges, exacerbated by the inclement weather and arduous terrain.  The lack of an 
LPH reduced the helicopter lift and thus the tactical mobility of the landing force, a 
problem exacerbated by the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor .   Fortunately, if 
anything, Argentine ground forces possessed even less tactical mobility.  The 
difficulty of supplying ground forces, particularly the provision of ammunition for the 
brigade’s light artillery batteries, illustrated the logistic problems inherent in any 
amphibious operation.26
The Official Response 
 
The initial UK government interpretation of the ‘lessons’ of the conflict was 
published in December 1982 in the government White Paper ‘The Falklands 
Campaign: The Lessons’.27  The paper placed a particular emphasis on the 
performance of key weapon systems, noting areas where improvements were 
required.  In a sign of things to come, the paper acknowledged the vital importance of 
satellite communications in operations conducted at great distance from the UK and 
announced plans to acquire a new British military satellite and to provide a satellite 
terminal in all major warships.   
 
The paper paid tribute to the training, motivation and professionalism of the British 
forces engaged and stressed that the specialist training of the Royal Marine 
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Commandos in the landing force was ‘a particularly significant asset’.  In a similar 
vein it noted that the experience gained from peacetime amphibious training 
conducted by the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines in support of their role 
reinforcing NATO’s northern flank had proven vital.  Typically, the report used its 
concluding remarks about amphibious forces to reaffirm their NATO role rather than 
to emphasize any future role in out of area operations.  Likewise, the inability of RAF 
Vulcan bombers to close Port Stanley airfield using 1,000-pound dumb bombs was 
used to demonstrate the need for the new JP 233 advanced airfield attack weapon 
intended primarily for use against the Warsaw Pact. 
 
In the maritime environment the paper noted the important sea denial role played by 
Royal Navy SSNs and also the challenges posed by enemy diesel/electric submarines 
operating in shallow water.  It reported on investigations into the survivability of 
warships and refuted the suggestion that the use of aluminum in their construction had 
contributed to the loss of any vessels.  It did, however, promise additional means to 
improve the damage control capabilities of warships.  The two aircraft carriers, HMS 
Hermes and HMS Invincible, were described as being effective and flexible command 
and control ships that also provided a good platform for air defense.  However, the 
paper acknowledged that the lack of organic AEW was a ‘severe handicap’ against 
Argentine low-level air attacks.  This problem would be remedied in part by the 
deployment in the carriers of Sea King helicopters equipped with Searchwater radars.  
This, in conjunction with steps to give the Sea Harriers greater range and payload 
capacity through the addition of larger drop tanks and additional weapons points, was 
deemed to represent a ‘major improvement in our carrier borne air defence 
capability’. 
 
The critical battle of the Falklands Campaign was waged between the ships and 
aircraft of the Royal Navy and the aircraft of the Argentine air force and navy.  
Quoting eight ‘kills’, the paper affirmed the value of the medium range Sea Dart 
missile.  It neglected to mention the system’s problems dealing with low flying 
aircraft or the fact that it was liable to be swamped by the arrival of large numbers of 
aircraft as it could not track and engage multiple targets.  The utility of the Sea Wolf 
point defense system was also noted and the speed with which its software was 
adapted to deal with low flying aircraft in addition to the missiles that it was designed 
to counter was cited as a particular success.  Nevertheless, the need for additional 
point defense systems was acknowledge and the paper noted that as an interim 
measure the US Vulcan-Phalanx gun system had been fitted to the carriers HMS 
Illustrious and HMS Invincible. 
 
One area where the specific requirements of ‘out of area’ operations was noted was in 
the field of logistic support where it was recognized that a special stockpile would 
need to be created to cater for such contingencies.  The value of long-range air 
transport and the need for a robust air-to-air refueling (AAR) capability was stressed.  
In a similar vein the vital role played by merchant ships taken up from trade (STUFT) 
in supplementing Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary shipping was noted, as was 
the sterling work of the dockyards, civilian ports and UK industry in general in 
preparing the task force as a whole for operations in the South Atlantic. 
 
The paper announced a number of programs designed to meet equipment shortfalls 
and to enhance capabilities where required.  Some of these, such as additions to 5th 
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Infantry Brigade to improve its parachute capabilities or the designation of a two-star 
headquarters to command forces committed to out of area operations, had been 
announced prior to the conflict.  New measures included the purchase of wide bodied 
tankers for AAR, additional Phantom F4-J fighters to replace aircraft sent to Port 
Stanley, additional Sea Harriers and Chinook medium lift helicopters and new point 
defense gun systems for the aircraft carriers, the LPDs and all of the navy’s Type 42 
air defense destroyers.  Most significantly, the government reversed its decision to sell 
HMS Invincible to Australia and announced its intention to maintain a fleet of three 
Invincible class carriers in order that two should be available for deployment at short 
notice.  The government also announced that front-line frigate and destroyer numbers 
would be maintained at ‘about 55’ compared to the 42 envisaged before the conflict.  
Equipment and vessels lost during the conflict would be replaced by new construction 
and, significantly, the cost of the war would not come from the Ministry of Defence 
budget but rather would be paid from the government’s contingency fund. 
 
The White Paper reaffirmed that government policy was for operations outside the 
NATO area to be undertaken by forces whose primary role was in support of the 
alliance.  It went on to claim that the campaign showed that many elements of the 
armed forces had the basic characteristics of flexibility and mobility which made them 
well suited to respond to challenges beyond Europe.  Capabilities were to be enhanced 
by the measures noted above but there would be no major change in the focus of 
defense policy.   
 
The claim that the Falklands campaign demonstrated that forces devoted to NATO 
tasks could also meet out of area contingencies appears rather sanguine.   In reality 
British victory was only possible because of the availability of several old platforms 
originally designed for operations beyond the NATO region and whose long-term 
future was open to some doubt.    The old aircraft carrier HMS Hermes made a vital 
contribution to air operations.  It was larger than the newer Invincible class and 
carried twice as many Harriers.  The British were fortunate that this old ship, launched 
in 1953, was still available and had not yet been replaced by its diminutive 
successor.28  The amphibious landings would not have been possible without the 
specialist amphibious shipping built in the 1960s and already showing signs of age.  
Even modern general-purpose ships like frigates and destroyers were less well suited 
to supporting expeditionary operations than older vessels.  The modern Type 42 
destroyer and Type 21 frigate each had only one 4.5-inch gun, compared to two in the 
older County class destroyers and Type 12 frigates.  The Type 42 and Type 21 were 
equipped with a more modern gun but the danger of relying on a single barrel for 
prolonged fire support became apparent when the frigate HMS Arrow (Type 21) 
designated to support the advance of 2 PARA on Goose Green developed a fault with 
its gun which stopped it firing.29  This problem was exacerbated as the gun armament 
in the Batch II and III Leander class frigates and the new Type 22 frigate had been 
removed entirely in order to make space for Exocet missile launchers. Clearly the 
ability to provide gunfire support for troops ashore had not figured prominently in 
their specifications.  British forces demonstrated admirable mobility and flexibility 
                                                 
28 At full load HMS Hermes displaced 28,700 tons compared to HMS Invincible which displaced 
19,500 tons.  For the Falklands Campaign Hermes embarked 15 Sea Harriers, 6 RAF GR3 Harriers and 
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during the Falklands Conflict.  Whether they would have done so without the ageing 
legacy of a previous capability is doubtful.   
Implementing the Lessons. 
One of the most striking features of the Falklands Conflict is just how little impact it 
had on the general direction of British defense policy.  Despite the changes noted 
above, The Lessons of the Falklands Campaign explicitly stated that the defense 
policy adopted in the 1981 review was extant.30  The four key roles adopted in 1975 
remained unchanged.  Unlike Suez in 1956, where failure reinforced the need for 
change, victory in the Falklands appeared to confirm the government’s claim that 
remaining out of area commitments could be met by forces devoted primarily to 
NATO duties.   All that was required were a limited number of force enhancements, 
some of which had been anticipated prior to the war. 
 
The main focus for defense policy remained the strategic nuclear deterrent, home 
defense, a major land and air contribution to the defense of the European mainland 
and a maritime capability in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel.  A typical explanation 
of British policy was provided in the 1985 Statement on the Defence Estimates, which 
made it clear that: 
 
NATO commitments will remain our overriding priority; and our ability to act 
outside the NATO area will be based on ensuring that selected units whose 
primary roles are within the Alliance can also deploy rapidly at long range in a 
crisis.31
 
Within this approach airborne forces, unused in their primary role since 195632, fared 
rather better than amphibious capabilities. John Nott had decided to increase Britain’s 
airborne capabilities prior to the Falklands Conflict.  Plans were made to increase the 
RAF’s air transport capability by ‘stretching’ 30 Hercules transport aircraft.  The 
decision was also taken to install special station-keeping radar equipment to enable 
aircraft to carry out the coordinated drop of a parachute assault force in poor 
weather.33  In 1984 it was announced that the 5th Infantry Brigade would receive a 
number of force enhancements, including an air defense troop and further signals, 
medical and logistics units.  The parachute capability of the brigade was to be 
increased to include the light gun regiment, the air defense troop and the integral 
logistic support units in addition to the parachute battalions of the Parachute 
Regiment.34  In view of these enhancements the brigade was renamed 5 Airborne 
Brigade.  By 1986 the government was able to announce that the UK was now ‘better 
able to launch a rapid and effective battalion group parachute assault, if the need 
ever arises’.35
 
                                                 
30 The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Cmnd. 8758. 
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34 Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1984. Part One, Cmnd. 9227-I   (London: HMSO, 1984) pp.32-
33. 
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Just as the UK approach to airborne capabilities remained unchanged by the 
Falklands Conflict, so did the approach towards amphibious capabilities. The primary 
role of UK amphibious forces remained the reinforcement of NATO’s Northern Flank 
in the event of a Soviet attack.  The two old LPDs had been reprieved prior to the 
conflict and both were retained after 1982, with one in service and the other in refit or 
on standby.  However, there were no plans to replace these ageing vessels nor were 
there any plans to build a dedicated helicopter assault ship to replace the commando 
carrier capability lost when HMS Hermes was sold to India in 1986.36  War loses 
were made good with the construction of a new ship to replace the LSL Sir Galahad 
lost at Bluff Cove, but it was clear that the amphibious fleet of the future, should it be 
maintained at all, would be based on ships built in the 1960s. 
 
The most obvious way in which maritime expeditionary capabilities benefited from 
the Falklands conflict was in the retention of all three Invincible class aircraft carriers.  
The sale of HMS Invincible, still envisaged in the 1982 Defence White Paper, was 
cancelled and the Royal Navy maintained a force of three aircraft carriers, with two in 
service, throughout the 1980s.  Shortcomings in AEW were partially rectified by the 
deployment of Sea King helicopters equipped with Searchwater AEW radar.  
However, in common with the rest of the Royal Navy, the carrier’s main tasks were 
associated with the battle for sea control in the eastern Atlantic, the English Channel 
and in northern waters providing ASW support for the NATO Strike Fleet. 
 
Despite the explicit focus on Europe the Royal Navy maintained a presence beyond 
the NATO area.   A small patrol of escort vessels was maintained in the Persian Gulf 
in order to provide for the security of British shipping in that region.  Royal Navy 
ships continued the practice of conducting exercises and port visits around the globe.  
Inevitably, the Falkland Islands now featured in the navy’s pattern of deployment 
with periodic visits by destroyers, frigates and SSNs.  However, in line with policy 
before 1982, the main focus of major naval deployments beyond the NATO area was 
the Indian Ocean and the Far East rather than the South Atlantic.   The first major 
Task Group deployment after the war occurred between September 1983 and April 
1984 when a Task Group based around the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible undertook 
a program of exercises and visits in the Indian Ocean, the Far East and the South 
Pacific.37  Subsequent major deployments were to follow a broadly similar pattern.  
The Falklands Conflict did not change the main focus of Britain’s maritime activity 
beyond Europe. 
Back to the Future. 
 
The basic nature of British defense policy did not change as a result of the Falklands 
conflict.  Europe and NATO remained the priorities, with out of area contingencies 
met by forces primarily devoted to NATO.  A number of force enhancements did 
occur due to the experience of 1982, most notably the retention of two rather than 
three small aircraft carriers.  However, many of the changes, such as the fitting of 
point defense gun systems to major surface vessels, reflected tactical lessons about the 
vulnerability of warships to missile attack rather than any strategic reevaluation.  A 
major sea change in British defense priorities did not occur until the end of the decade 
                                                 
36 HMS Hermes had a dual role as an aircraft carrier and a commando carrier/LPH. 
37 Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1984. Part One, Cmnd. 9227-I (London: HMSO, 1984) p.32 
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when the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union itself 
brought a fundamental change in the strategic environment. 
 
The UK government’s most basic response to these changes was to seize the 
opportunity to reduce the defense budget.  Over the 1990s defense spending fell by 
some twenty per cent.38   Within this constraint British defense policy was now 
characterized in terms of three main defense roles: 
  
1. Defense Role One:  home defense and defense of the dependent territories 
2. Defense Role Two: defense of Europe through NATO 
3. Defense Role Three: peacekeeping, out-of-area responsibilities  
 
In reality defense role two remained the key role for Britain’s armed forces and this 
was reflected in the commitment of two divisions and a headquarters to the new 
Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.  The costs of maintaining a major 
force in mainland Europe, allied to the reductions in the defense budget, made it 
difficult for the government to meet its declared aim of making UK forces more 
flexible, deployable and sustainable.39
 
By this time the issue of replacements for the navy’s ageing amphibious ships had 
become urgent.  As early as 1985 the Ministry of Defence had announced that it was 
investigating a range of options for providing a future amphibious capability.  In 1986 
it was reported that £450 million had been set aside in the Long-Term Costings to 
cover the modernization of both LPDs together with the possible conversion of two 
container ships into helicopter equipped commando carriers.40  Swan Hunter 
Shipbuilders was awarded a contract to examine the feasibility of a service life 
extension program (SLEP) to allow the two LPDs to remain in service beyond the 
mid-1990s.41   Progress was slow.  The 1988 and 1989 Defense White Papers both 
noted that these feasibility studies were underway but did not commit the government 
to any action.42     
 
Further progress did not occur until the end of the Cold War brought a slow change in 
the focus of defense policy.  In 1991 the government announced its intention to 
‘replace and improve’ the Royal Navy’s amphibious shipping and in 1992 a £2.5 
million contract was awarded for a project definition study for Landing Platform 
Dock (Replacement) (LPD(R)).43   Despite serious fears that these ships might fall 
prey to Treasury imposed cuts, invitations to tender for LPD(R) were issued in August 
1994 and in July 1996 Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd (VSEL) was 
awarded the contract to build two ships to replace HMS Fearless and Intrepid.44  The 
two ships, to adopt the old commando carrier names HMS Albion and Bulwark, were 
to enter service in 2001 and 2003 respectively, although subsequent delays mean that 
the first ship will not enter service before 2003.   
                                                 
38 L Freedman, The Politics of British Defence1979-98, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) p. 96. 
39 A Dorman, ‘Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British 
Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’ in Defense Analysis Vol. 17, No. 2, 2001, pp187-22. 
40 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p. 386 
41 Warship World Vol. 3, No.6  Spring 1990 p.4 
42 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1989. Volume I. Cm 675-I. (London: HMSO, 1989) p.24 
43 Warship World Vol 4 No.2. Spring 1992 p.8 
44 Jane’s Navy International, Vol. 101 No. 7, September 1996. 
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Significant progress was also made with other aspects of the amphibious capability.  
In 1986 the government announced plans to procure two new Aviation Support Ships.  
Tenders were invited in October 1988 and bids were received from three consortia.  
Unfortunately budgetary provision proved inadequate and the project was shelved.  It 
was revived after the ‘Options for Change’ defense review and invitations to tender 
were issued in February 1992.  The project remained blighted by budgetary 
constraints despite the reduction in scope to only one vessel, now described as an 
LPH.  Operations in the Adriatic off the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in early 1993 
demonstrated the difficulties of conducting helicopter operations from inadequate 
shipping and this, allied to concerns about the financial position of some British 
shipyards, may have helped to revive the procurement process.  In May 1993 VSEL 
was awarded the contract to build a new LPH costing £143.9 million and to be 
christened HMS Ocean.  This ship was commissioned in 1998.45
 
The third component of the amphibious fleet was the five Landing Ship Logistics 
(LSLs) operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.  Of these, one (Sir Galahad) had been 
built after the Falklands Conflict to replace the original lost at Bluff Cove and another 
(Sir Tristram) had undergone a major re-build in order to make good damage 
sustained in the same attack.   A third ship (Sir Bedivere) underwent a SLEP refit 
from 1994-1998 to extend its useful life by a further 15 years.  Unfortunately the 
excess cost and disappointing results of this process resulted in the cancellation of 
similar SLEP refits for the two remaining LSLs (Sir Geraint and Sir Percivale).  It 
was decided, instead, to replace these two ships with new larger and more capable 
Alternative LSLs (ALSLs).46
 
Maritime expeditionary capabilities were enhanced in a variety of other ways.  The 
value of traditional naval gunfire was demonstrated during the Falklands conflict, 
where navy 4.5-inch guns provided vital fire support for ground forces and proved to 
be an effective anti-surface warfare weapon against Argentinean supply vessels.  Prior 
to the conflict there had been a trend to replace these guns with missile systems such 
as the Exocet missiles fitted to the early Type-22 frigates.  After the conflict the value 
of the gun was recognized and Batch III Type-22 frigates and the new Type-23 
frigates were all fitted with a 4.5-inch gun in addition to their missile armament.   
More remarkably, the government announced the purchase of 65 Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missiles (TLAM) from the United States.47  These missiles, to be fired from 
SSNs, would provide the British with a long-range precision strike cruise missile 
capability.  For the first time, Royal Navy SSNs would have a significant power 
projection capability. 
 
Perhaps the biggest test of UK attitudes towards maritime expeditionary capabilities 
came with the case for the aircraft carriers.  As noted above, the Falklands Conflict 
led to the retention of all three Invincible class aircraft carriers, although with only 
two air groups.  There were no plans to replace these small ships with larger, more 
capable vessels.  The primary role for the carriers remained that of providing ASW 
support to the NATO Striking Fleet, with any expeditionary capability coming as 
                                                 
45 R Scott, ‘Ocean’s wave is set to roll’ in Jane’s Navy International, Vol. 104 No. 4, September 1999. 
46  ‘RFA crucial in expeditionary warfare’ in Jane’s Navy International January/February 2001. pp.19-
23. 
47 Dorman, ‘Back to the Future’, p.167. 
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something of a bonus. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new 
challenges beyond continental Europe this secondary role became their primary 
rationale.  UK carriers found gainful employment in support of British policy in the 
Adriatic and the Persian Gulf.  In order to boost the power projection capability of 
these vessels RAF ground-attack Harrier GR7s were embarked in addition to the 
normal complement of Sea Harriers.   The Sea Harriers themselves underwent a major 
upgrade, receiving new radar, avionics and advanced missiles.  In order to provide 
more space on deck and to give more internal space for equipment and ammunition all 
three ships had their Sea Dart area-air-defense missile systems removed.  These 
measures combined to make the three carriers much more capable power projection 
platforms than was the case in 1982.  However, their limited size restricts both the 
number and type of aircraft that can be embarked.48  These ships were not designed as 
power projection platforms and their limitations have become apparent in recent 
operations. 
 
In 1997 a new Labour administration was elected after 18 years of Conservative rule.  
On taking office the new government undertook a major reevaluation of UK defense 
policy.  Its aim was to set a blueprint to modernize and reshape the armed forces to 
meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.  The result was the 1998 Strategic 
Defense Review (SDR).  The SDR reflected, reinforced and codified existing 
developments in British defense policy.  It emphasized that there was now no direct 
military threat to the UK or Western Europe and, while this situation could not be 
taken for granted, there was a greater need to meet security challenges on the fringes 
of Europe and beyond.  The paper placed a firm emphasis on mobile, flexible and 
deployable forces able to meet the diverse challenges of the future.  The Minister of 
Defense, George Robertson, succinctly summed up future requirements by stating that 
‘In the post Cold War world, we must be prepared to go to the crisis rather than have 
the crisis come to us’.49
 
The SDR announced significant reductions in maritime capabilities as the threat of 
large-scale open-ocean warfare was seen to have receded.  The SSN fleet was to be 
reduced from 12 to 10 boats.  The total number of destroyers and frigates were 
reduced from 35 to 32 vessels and a planned increase in mine countermeasures 
vessels was reduced from a total of 25 to 22 hulls.  The purchase of new EH 101 
Merlin anti-submarine warfare helicopters was limited to 44 and the RAF’s Tornado 
aircraft were to withdraw from the anti-shipping role.50   
 
To counter-balance these reductions the SDR announced that the focus for maritime 
forces in future would be rapid deployment operations.  The Invincible class carriers 
were to be given a wider power-projection role by the development of a Joint Force 
2000 combining Royal Navy and RAF Harriers under one command.  In future both 
types would operate from the carriers as required.51  Most significantly, the SDR 
                                                 
48 After the removal of their Sea Dart systems the carrier’s air complement can include eight FA2 Sea 
Harriers and eight RAF GR7 Harriers in addition to AEW and ASW helicopters. R Sharpe, Jane’s 
Fighting Ships 2000-2001, (Coulsdon: Jane’s, 2000) p. 754.  This is still rather less than the air group 
deployed on HMS Hermes in 1982.  
49 The Strategic Defence Review, Cmnd. 3999, (London: HMSO, 1998) Introduction para.6. 
50 Ibid. chapter 7. 
51 In a move designed to increase British power projection capabilities on 28 February 2002 the 
Ministry of Defence announced that in future and prior to the arrival of the Future Joint Combat 
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announced plans to replace the existing three aircraft carriers with two larger vessels 
from around 2012.  At 30,000 - 40,000 tons these new ships would be up to twice the 
size of HMS Invincible and would be capable of deploying up to 50 fixed and rotary 
winged aircraft.  Expeditionary capabilities were further reinforced by the decision to 
fit all SSNs to fire TLAM, the decision to continue the construction of the two 
LPD(R)s and the potential deployment of army WAH-64 Apache Longbow attack 
helicopters on HMS Ocean.52
 
Contemporary British defense policy has an overtly expeditionary focus.  The armed 
forces have adopted the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces concept based upon a flexible 
pool of powerful and adaptable units and capabilities from all three services that can 
be put together to meet particular circumstances.53  The emphasis is on mobile, 
flexible and deployable forces.  The ability of the Navy and Royal Marines to exploit 
joint assets such as RAF GR7 Harrier and Army attack helicopters should greatly 
enhance maritime expeditionary capabilities.   Contemporary naval doctrine 
articulates a case for the navy as a key enabler for future joint operations.  The Royal 
Navy Strategic Plan for the period 2000-2015 declares that: 
 
The emphasis will be on expeditionary and littoral warfare, and our 
contribution to joint and combined operations, particularly at small and 
medium scales of effort.54
 
The Royal Marines have an important role to play within this concept and are 
currently reconfiguring under the Commando 21 initiatives in order to be able to meet 
future challenges. 55   Current doctrine, evolving under the concept of ‘Littoral 
Manoeuvre’, reflects contemporary US ideas about expeditionary operations such as 
ship to objective maneuver, sea basing, and over the horizon operations, albeit on a 
reduced scale commensurate with British capabilities. 
The Lessons of the Falklands Conflict? 
 
In 1978 HMS Ark Royal, the navy’s last large conventional aircraft carrier, was 
decommissioned.  The decision to scrap such vessels had been supported by the 
following statement in the 1966 Defense Review: 
 
Only one type of operation exists for which carriers and carrier borne aircraft 
would be indispensable; that is the landing or withdrawal of troops against 
sophisticated opposition beyond the range of land-based air cover.  It is only 
                                                                                                                                            
Aircraft in 2012 only one type of Harrier would be maintained.  Thus, from around 2006 Joint Force 
Harrier will deploy the GR9, an updated version of the GR7 and the FA2 Sea Harrier will be 
withdrawn from service.  This will enhance the ground attack capabilities of the carrier air groups but 
may seriously reduce the fleet air defence capabilities of the carriers as, unlike the FA2, the GR9 lacks 
radar and will only be equipped with short-range air-to-air weapons for self defense. In a development 
somewhat reminiscent of decisions taken in the 1960s, the fleet will be reliant for air defence on the 
surface to air missiles of the new Type-45 destroyers currently being developed. (Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, March 01 2002)   
52 Ibid. 
53 ‘Joint Rapid Reaction Forces – Special Report’, in Defence Review Winter 1998, pp.38-48. 
54 Navy Strategic Plan 2000-2015, www.royal-navy.mod.uk. downloaded 14 January 2002. 
55 ‘Commando Units to be Reshaped’ in Navy News, January 2001. pp 1-2. 
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realistic that we, unaided by our allies, could not expect to undertake 
operations of this character in the 1970s.56
 
Sixteen years later, and only one year after the Nott review had confirmed the basic 
logic of this decision, the British launched a brigade sized amphibious operation 
against sophisticated opposition beyond the range of land-based air cover and without 
the direct aid of allies. 
 
It would be unfair to criticize the culmination of 16 years of British defense policy on 
the basis of a conflict that was as unexpected as it was unusual.  Nevertheless, the 
conflict did illustrate a key weakness in British defense planning at this time.  In order 
to devote limited resources to seemingly vital NATO roles, capabilities for action 
beyond Europe were progressively reduced without an equivalent reduction in 
commitments.  Notwithstanding the modest increases announced prior to 1982, out of  
area contingencies would be met by forces devoted to the alliance.  This was based 
upon the assumption that forces devoted to NATO would have sufficient mobility and 
flexibility to meet challenges overseas.  Superficially, success during the Falklands 
Conflict appeared to support this case.  However, in reality, British victory was far 
from certain.   A slightly more capable opponent or perhaps a luckier one might have 
been able to exploit more successfully the serious weaknesses in some areas of the 
British task force.  In many respects British success rested a number of old ‘legacy’ 
platforms whose future had been open to some doubt.  Despite this, the experience of 
1982 did not cause the government to change its view that it did not require a special 
military capability for intervention overseas.  
 
Twenty years later the UK places a much higher priority on maritime expeditionary 
capabilities.  One may question the extent to which this is a result of the ‘lessons of 
the Falklands Conflict’.  The war certainly provided a useful insight into the 
performance of particular weapon systems, tactics, and the design of warships but it 
did not prompt a major strategic reappraisal nor did it solve the enduring problem of 
resources.  In reality the current British focus on expeditionary operations is a result 
of a change in strategic priorities that was entirely unconnected to the Falklands 
Conflict.   Likewise, contemporary doctrine is influenced by a general body of 
experience that includes the events of 1982.  However, neither contemporary British 
nor US doctrine has its origins in the ‘lessons’ of that conflict.  Rather they reflect an 
appreciation of the potential of new and evolving technologies to radically alter the 
way in which navies operate, both offensively and defensively, allied to an 
understanding of the changing political context within which military force will be 
applied.    In a manner reminiscent of the early 1960s, British defense policy has 
seized the opportunity presented by stability in Europe to meet the challenge posed by 
instability elsewhere.  Shorn of the Soviet threat, the armed forces no longer struggle 
to meet world-wide commitments with forces designed primarily for major war in 
Europe.  Rather, both procurement and doctrine reflect a primary emphasis on the 
requirements of expeditionary operations.  For the first time in thirty years British 
defense policy once again recognizes the requirement for a ‘Special Military 
Capability’ for intervention overseas.  The result is likely to be a significant 
enhancement in expeditionary capabilities in general, and maritime expeditionary 
capabilities in particular. 
 
                                                 
56  Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Cmnd 2901.p.10 
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Despite this, the key problem of resources remains.  The announcement in February 
2002 that in future, prior to the arrival of the Future Joint Combat Aircraft in 2012, 
only one type of Harrier would be retained, illustrates an enduring problem.  The 
technical and logistical problems of maintaining and updating two different types of 
Harrier have proven to be beyond British resources.  Thus, from around 2006 Joint 
Force Harrier will deploy the GR9, an updated version of the RAF GR7 and the FA2 
Sea Harrier will be withdrawn from service.  This will enhance the ground attack 
capabilities of the carrier air groups making them more effective power projection 
platforms when there is not a significant air threat.  However, the decision may 
seriously reduce the fleet air defence capabilities of the carriers as, unlike the FA2, the 
GR9 lacks radar and will only be equipped with short-range air-to-air weapons for 
self defense. In a development somewhat reminiscent of decisions taken in the 1960s, 
the fleet will be reliant for air defence on the surface to air missiles of the new Type-
45 destroyers currently being developed. (Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 01 2002)   
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